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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons on Their Destruction, and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Background document prepared by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

I. Introduction

1. On 22 December 2018, the General Assembly adopted decision 73/546 on convening a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in which it entrusted to the Secretary-General the convening, no later than 2019, of a conference on that topic. It also requested the Secretary-General to convene annual sessions of the Conference. In accordance with that mandate, the Secretary-General convened the first session in November 2019, with subsequent annual sessions held in 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024.

2. In correspondence dated 3 June 2025, the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations, as the President-designate of the sixth session of the Conference, invited the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to prepare a background document for the consideration of the Conference at its sixth session. The present document is hereby submitted pursuant to that request.

II. Chemical Weapons Convention

3. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction is an international treaty whose main object and purpose are to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. To that end, it establishes a global verification regime to monitor the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and to monitor the production, processing and consumption of toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited under the



Convention, to prevent the re-emergence of such weapons. The Convention contains provisions for international cooperation to support the peaceful and authorized uses of chemistry, as well as for assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997.

4. The Convention establishes a global prohibition on chemical weapons through the verified elimination of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. All States Parties to the Convention must never develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use chemical weapons, or transfer them to other parties. They must destroy any chemical weapons that they own or possess or that they abandoned on the territory of another State Party. Furthermore, they must destroy or convert facilities that they own or possess that were involved in the production of chemical weapons.

5. The global elimination of chemical weapons rests on two conditions: acceptance of the Convention by all States and compliance by all States Parties with their obligations.

III. Work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

6. OPCW is an independent international organization established in 1997 upon the entry into force of the Convention. Under the terms of the Convention, OPCW undertakes global activities that include: inspecting and verifying the destruction of existing chemical weapons; conducting chemical industry inspections; providing assistance and protection to its Member States in cases of the use of or the threat of the use of chemical weapons; and promoting international cooperation for the peaceful and authorized uses of chemistry.

IV. Verification regime

A. Overview of the verification regime

7. The Convention is underpinned by a robust and comprehensive verification regime. Verification is the process by which OPCW ensures that States Parties are in compliance with their obligations according to the following procedures: assessing declarations made by States Parties on a regular basis; conducting regular on-site inspections of declared military or industrial sites and/or facilities to verify the accuracy of submitted declarations; conducting challenge inspections upon request; and investigating the alleged use of chemical weapons. As part of the verification regime, OPCW has established a network of designated laboratories for the independent off-site analysis of environmental and biomedical samples. The laboratories take part in OPCW proficiency tests to maintain their designation status, thereby ensuring their fitness for purpose.

8. The Annex on Chemicals to the Convention contains the three schedules of chemicals, based on the following criteria:

(a) Schedule 1:

- (i) Toxic chemicals with little or no peaceful purpose;
- (ii) Developed or used primarily as a chemical weapon;

(b) Schedule 2:

- (i) Chemicals that can be used for chemical weapons production, but have certain legitimate uses;

- (ii) Not produced in large commercial quantities;
- (c) Schedule 3:
 - (i) Chemicals that can be used for chemical weapons production, but have significant legitimate uses;
 - (ii) Produced in large commercial quantities.

There are comprehensive guidelines that provide a process for the inclusion of new generations of chemicals in the schedule list.

B. Chemical weapons demilitarization

9. Central to the implementation of the Convention is the verified destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, including the destruction or conversion of chemical weapons production facilities.

10. The Convention includes regulations on the destruction of chemical weapons, including an obligation not to harm people or the environment. Accordingly, possessor States Parties are required to use safe methods and technologies for destroying chemical weapons. OPCW continuously monitors and verifies the destruction of such weapons.

11. As of August 2025, 100 per cent, or 72,304 tons, of chemical weapons declared by States Parties had been destroyed. On 7 July 2023, OPCW confirmed that the United States of America, the last remaining declared possessor State Party, had completed the destruction of 100 per cent of its chemical weapons stockpiles.¹

12. Since the entry into force of the Convention, 97 chemical weapons production facilities have been declared by 14 States Parties. As of August 2025, all declared chemical weapons production facilities had been destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. Of those, 74 had been destroyed by 13 States Parties and 23 had been converted to peaceful purposes by 5 States Parties. OPCW regularly inspects former chemical weapons production facilities that remain subject to verification, to further ensure compliance with the Convention.

13. States Parties must also declare and undertake to destroy old and abandoned chemical weapons. OPCW monitors such destruction activities.

14. As of the end of August 2025, OPCW had conducted 3,518 chemical weapons inspections since the entry into force of the Convention.

C. Industry verification

15. The basis for the OPCW industry verification regime is established in article VI of the Convention. States Parties are obliged to identify and declare specific activities and facilities in which scheduled chemicals are involved to ensure that they are used exclusively for purposes not prohibited under the Convention.

16. States Parties are prohibited from trading schedule 1 and schedule 2 chemicals with countries that are not Party to the Convention. Monitoring the international trade

¹ States Parties must declare all chemical weapons stockpiles, which fall into three categories for the purpose of destruction: category 1, chemical weapons based on schedule 1 chemicals and their parts and components; category 2, chemical weapons based on all other chemicals and their parts and components; and category 3, unfilled munitions and devices, as well as equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of chemical weapons.

and transfer of all scheduled chemicals declared by States Parties is an essential part of the efforts of OPCW to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

17. Other chemical production facilities that are facilities that may be capable of manufacturing chemical weapons-related materials are also subject to declaration and verification under article VI.

18. As of the end of August 2025, the Technical Secretariat had conducted 4,891 industry inspections in more than 80 States Parties since the entry into force of the Convention.

D. Challenge inspections

19. As a means to resolve a serious concern about compliance, any State Party can call for a short-notice inspection in any other State Party. The challenge inspection can be conducted without the right of refusal, unless a three-quarters majority of the OPCW Executive Council decides against the request.

20. While no State Party has yet requested a challenge inspection, OPCW carries out challenge inspection exercises for training and preparedness purposes.

E. Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons

21. The use of chemical weapons constitutes a grave breach of the Convention and of international law. Accordingly, the Convention contains provisions that allow OPCW to conduct investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons. In a scenario involving the alleged use of chemical weapons by a State not Party to the Convention or in a territory controlled by such a State, an investigation can be requested through the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, established through General Assembly resolution [42/37 C](#). In such a case, OPCW can place its resources at the disposal of the Secretary-General.

V. Role of the Convention in regional peace and security

A. Universality

22. As of September 2025, there were four States not Party to the Convention: one was a signatory (Israel), and three were non-signatories (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt and South Sudan).

23. Universality underpins the full and global implementation of the Convention. Only through universal adherence can there be an assurance that all countries are legally bound to uphold the prohibition on chemical weapons.

24. OPCW therefore attaches a high priority to achieving the universality of the Convention and maintains contact with representatives of States not Party to the Convention in order to raise awareness of and sustain a positive dialogue on the importance of joining the Convention.

B. Countering chemical terrorism

25. The contribution of OPCW to global anti-terrorism efforts is enshrined in several articles of the Convention. It is based on the decision adopted by the OPCW Executive Council at its twenty-seventh session on the OPCW contribution to global

anti-terrorist efforts, namely, that the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention is in itself a contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts (decision EC-XXVII/DEC.5 of 7 December 2001, para. 1).

26. In its decision on addressing the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors (EC-86/DEC.9 of 13 October 2017), the Council underscored that the development, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons by non-State actors posed a fundamental threat to the object and purpose of the Convention and to the achievement of a world free of chemical weapons, and that any actor who engaged in or attempted to engage in such activities must be held accountable.

27. In working to counter the threat of chemical terrorism, the Secretariat seeks to support its Member States in realizing the full and effective implementation of the Convention while also ensuring that it coordinates its efforts, both in prevention and response, with other relevant stakeholders in the international system.

28. Since 2018, as part of its commitment to international coordination on counter-terrorism activities, OPCW has been a signatory to the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and a member of the Compact's Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection. OPCW has also served as vice-chair of the Working Group alongside the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, under the chairmanship of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

29. In 2024 and 2025, the Secretariat continued to engage with external partners on the threat posed by non-State actors. These partners included the Group of Experts of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office for Disarmament Affairs. Collaboration focused on strengthening States Parties' awareness of their relevant obligations, and offering practical assistance in the areas in which the Convention and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) are mutually reinforcing, namely, national legislation, chemical security, and customs and border control.

30. The Secretariat contributed to regional and national workshops aimed at strengthening the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which had been organized by the above-mentioned partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The Secretariat underscored the relevant obligations under the Convention that correspond with resolution 1540 (2004). At the same time, external partners supported selected OPCW activities. A representative from the Office for Disarmament Affairs attended the annual meeting of the national authorities in November 2024 and a representative from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific participated in a similar regional meeting in Asia.

C. Regional capacity-building and assistance and protection

31. Under the Convention, the Secretariat provides technical assistance through a wide range of capacity-building programmes that facilitate the development of national implementing legislation, enhance the capacity of States Parties to use chemistry for peaceful purposes, and assist States Parties in preparing for and responding to threats involving toxic chemicals.

32. The Secretariat provides tailored assistance and capacity-building support to aid States Parties in the development and adoption of national legislation to fulfil their obligations under the Convention. Among the States members of the Conference, 14 countries (58 per cent) have comprehensive legislation on implementing the

Convention, 5 countries (21 per cent) have legislation on the Convention that covers relevant measures only partially and 5 countries (21 per cent, including 2 that are not States Parties to the Convention) have no legislation on the Convention.

33. The Secretariat offers a series of capacity-building programmes aimed at fostering the peaceful uses of chemistry and contributing to the economic and technological development of States Parties. Within this framework, the chemical safety and security management programme plays an important role in promoting the responsible use of chemistry and supporting non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East. The Secretariat organizes seminars focused on that programme. One such seminar is regularly hosted by Qatar, and benefits, among others, States members of OPCW in the Middle East. These seminars are designed to mitigate chemical risks and ensure the safe and secure handling of dual-use chemicals. In addition to contributing to non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East, OPCW provided platforms for experts to develop indicative guidelines on chemical safety and security, and organized specialized training for law enforcement and customs laboratory personnel on the identification of chemicals related to the Convention. To date, OPCW has released two guidelines related to the transport of hazardous chemicals by road and to security management at small and medium-sized enterprises, while further work is focused on dual-use chemical supply chains.

34. The Secretariat also assists States Parties in capacity-building to prepare for and respond to the use of chemical weapons. Capacity-building activities include international and regional training; specialized training in subjects such as sampling and analysis, laboratory skills, medical and pre-hospital treatment and hospital preparedness; and courses for first responders. Since 2015, the Secretariat has conducted a capacity-building programme for States Parties in the Middle East to enhance regional capabilities to respond to incidents involving chemical warfare agents and toxic chemicals. This programme has had more than 650 participants from the Middle East region, including first responders and other experts from national institutions involved in chemical emergency response.

35. The increasingly demanding security environment, including the growing threat of the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, has underlined the importance of programmes in the area of assistance and protection, as well as the interest of States Parties in such programmes.

36. The OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology continues to be utilized for capacity-building and training for experts from States Parties, inspectorate training, laboratory exercises, proficiency testing, knowledge-building and knowledge-sharing, scientific research, and international cooperation and assistance programmes. With enhanced remote capacity-building and training capabilities, the Centre has also generated cost efficiencies and facilitated improved online training experiences. The Centre has been further leveraged to better address the needs of States Parties in terms of training and exchange of expertise.

D. Regional activities

State of Palestine

37. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force for the State of Palestine on 16 June 2018, following its accession to the Convention on 17 May 2018.

38. In 2025, the Secretariat has engaged with the State of Palestine, upon its request, on the provision of training to strengthen its capacity to respond to incidents involving toxic chemicals. The State of Palestine was represented at the twenty-sixth OPCW Associate Programme, held from 28 July to 25 September 2025, which provided

training on the implementation of the Convention and OPCW activities. The State of Palestine also participated in the course on the enhancement of laboratory skills in liquid chromatography and mass spectrometry, held from 15 to 26 September 2025. It was the first time that the State of Palestine had participated in these activities.

Syrian Arab Republic

Destruction of chemical weapons

39. On 14 October 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic became a State Party to the Convention, following its accession to the Convention on 14 September 2013. The Joint Mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic was established on 16 October 2013 to oversee the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. More than 1,300 tons of declared chemical agents were removed and destroyed during the operation. The complete destruction of the chemical weapons declared by the Syrian Arab Republic was verified by the Secretariat on 6 January 2016.

40. However, the Secretariat was never able to verify that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic was accurate and complete. In addition, numerous instances of the use of chemical weapons were documented by the Secretariat after the Syrian Arab Republic joined the Convention and, in some instances, the Syrian armed forces were identified as the perpetrator. On the basis of these facts, it is confirmed that the former Syrian authorities continually, but unsuccessfully, tried to mislead the Secretariat as to the true extent of their secret chemical weapons programme.

41. Since the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, the Secretariat has been pursuing renewed engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic. The Director General visited Damascus on 8 February 2025 and met with President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani. On 5 March, the Foreign Minister visited OPCW in The Hague and addressed the Executive Council. On these occasions and in other instances, the Syrian Arab Republic declared its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Convention and related decisions of the policymaking organs and Security Council resolutions, in close cooperation with OPCW, and requested support for this task from the international community. Since the Director General's visit to Damascus, the Secretariat has been deploying to the Syrian Arab Republic continuously.

42. The current priority is to identify any remaining chemical weapons and any other undeclared components of the previous Government's clandestine chemical weapons programme, and assist the new Syrian authorities with declaring them and ensuring their irreversible destruction in accordance with the Convention. On 8 October 2025, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision in this respect, authorizing, inter alia, the expedited on-site destruction of chemical weapons, if required and subject to conditions.

43. The Secretariat has continuously been streamlining its efforts in fulfilment of all the mandates entrusted to it under the Convention and the decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs, including the clarification of the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic on its chemical weapons programme, the establishment of the facts surrounding the allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the identification of perpetrators in instances where use or likely use has been established.

44. To this end, in June 2025 the Secretariat established the Office of Special Missions, which will, inter alia, continue to organize and conduct all OPCW mandated

activities in the Syrian Arab Republic through coordination with all relevant units in the Secretariat, as well as with States Parties, as required. The Office's team has conducted several deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic, visiting sites and collecting samples, and is establishing a permanent presence there to facilitate ongoing activities.

Verification of the initial declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic

45. In April 2014, the Director General of OPCW established the Declaration Assessment Team with the mandate to verify that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic could be considered accurate and complete, as required by the Convention and decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the OPCW Executive Council.

46. A total of 27 rounds of consultations have been conducted between the Team and the former Syrian authorities, which have included: technical meetings; interviews with persons involved in the chemical weapons programme; visits to chemical weapons-related sites involving the collection and analysis of samples; and the receipt, review, evaluation and analysis of documents and information.

47. As a result of the work of the Team, the former Syrian authorities have submitted 20 amendments to the country's initial declaration, declaring additional previously undeclared elements of its chemical weapons programme.

48. Before the change of government in the Syrian Arab Republic, the total number of outstanding issues reported by the Secretariat since 2014 stood at 26. Of these, 7 had been resolved, while 19 remained unresolved. The substance of the 19 outstanding issues remained a serious concern to the Secretariat, as it involved large quantities of potentially undeclared or unverified chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions. In addition, the Syrian Arab Republic had yet to complete all of the measures specified in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2, adopted on 9 July 2020.

49. Since December 2024, the Team, supported by experts from other relevant units of the Secretariat, deployed on a number of occasions to the Syrian Arab Republic, engaging with the new Syrian authorities on logistics and planning for future activities. The Team also conducted site visits, collected samples and documents from the locations visited and held interviews and technical meetings with chemical weapons experts.

50. The new Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has stated its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Convention in close cooperation with OPCW. The Secretariat will continue to assist the new Syrian authorities in identifying and declaring any remaining undeclared chemical weapons and other components of the former Government's chemical weapons programme, and in irreversibly destroying them, as required under the Convention and relevant decisions of the OPCW policymaking organs.

Establishing facts surrounding allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons

51. In response to persistent allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic, the OPCW fact-finding mission in the Syrian Arab Republic was set up in April 2014 to establish facts surrounding allegations of the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes in that country.

52. Under the agreed terms of reference between the Secretariat and the Syrian Arab Republic, the fact-finding mission has conducted visits to sites of alleged use of chemical weapons, where possible, and has interviewed witnesses, alleged victims, first responders and treating physicians. The fact-finding mission has also examined relevant documents and reports, including medical and hospital records, and obtained

copies of such documents. In addition, environmental and biomedical samples have been collected and independently analysed by the OPCW network of designated laboratories.

53. Since its creation, the fact-finding mission has been deployed on 72 missions and has issued 22 reports covering 76 allegations. Through its reports, the mission has identified a total of 20 incidents involving the likely or confirmed use of chemical weapons: 14 of chlorine, 3 of sulfur mustard and 3 of sarin.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism

54. Following the findings of the fact-finding mission that chlorine had been used as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, in March 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2209 (2015), in which it condemned any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic. Recalling that resolution, on 7 August 2015, the Council adopted resolution 2235 (2015) establishing the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. The Mechanism's mandate was renewed on 17 November 2016 in Council resolution 2319 (2016). In November 2017, the Council did not renew the mandate.

55. The mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism was to identify the perpetrators involved in the use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in those instances in which the fact-finding mission had determined that an incident in that country involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons. During its period of activity, the Mechanism submitted seven reports to the Security Council attributing responsibility to the Syrian Arab Republic for four incidents (Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, Qaminas and Sarmin on 16 March 2015 and Tallmannis on 21 April 2014) and to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Islamic State) for two (Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 and Mari' on 21 August 2015).

Identifying the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

56. The Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, at its fourth special session in June 2018, adopted a decision on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use. As part of the decision, the Conference decided that the Secretariat should put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (C-SS-4/DEC.3, dated 27 June 2018, para. 10).

57. To carry out the mandate, OPCW created the Investigation and Identification Team, which became fully operational in July 2019. The Team is charged with identifying and reporting on all information that is potentially relevant to the origin of chemical weapons in instances in which the fact-finding mission determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred and cases regarding which the Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report.

58. The Secretariat has issued four reports of the Team on its investigations into six separate incidents. The first report, which was focused on three incidents that occurred in Lataminah, Syrian Arab Republic, on 24, 25 and 30 March 2017 (note S/1867/2020, dated 8 April 2020), contains the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force used chemical weapons in Lataminah on three occasions in March 2017. Sarin was used on two occasions and chlorine was used on one occasion.

59. The second report of the Team, which set out the findings of the investigations conducted into the incident in Saraqib, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 4 February 2018

(note S/1943/2021, dated 12 April 2021), contains the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force, under the control of the Tiger Forces, hit eastern Saraqib by dropping at least one chlorine-filled cylinder.

60. The third report of the Team focused on an incident in Duma, the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018 (note S/2125/2023, dated 27 January 2023), and contains the conclusion that there were reasonable grounds to believe that at least one helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two chlorine-filled cylinders that hit a residential area in Duma, killing 43 named individuals and affecting dozens more.

61. The fourth report of the Team sets out the findings of the investigations relating to the incident in Mari', the Syrian Arab Republic, on 1 September 2015 (note S/2255/2024, dated 22 February 2024). It concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that, on 1 September 2015, during sustained attacks aimed at capturing the town of Mari', units of ISIL deployed sulfur mustard, using one or more artillery guns.

62. While the former Government had refused to acknowledge the Team, the new Syrian authorities have acknowledged the mandate of the Secretariat to identify perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and welcomed ongoing and future activities related to investigation and the identification of perpetrators of use of chemical weapons, as well as the broader coordination in relation to addressing the use of chemical weapons. The Secretariat is continuing its investigations in accordance with the note entitled "Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)" (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course.

Libya

63. Upon joining the Convention in 2004, Libya declared category 1, category 2 and category 3 chemical weapons. Under OPCW verification, the country completed the destruction of its category 1 and category 3 chemicals in May 2014 and May 2013, respectively.

64. Upon joining the Convention, Libya also declared three chemical weapons production facilities. One of them has been certified by the Secretariat as having been destroyed in March 2005, and two of them have been certified as converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention and remain subject to verification. The two converted facilities were inspected in November 2024. During the period from 2025 to 2028, the activities at the facilities will continue to be verified through data monitoring.

65. In July 2016, the Government of National Accord of Libya asked for support and assistance in transporting and destroying outside Libyan territory the final remnants of its category 2 chemical weapons. Assistance was provided to Libya pursuant to a decision of the OPCW Executive Council (EC-M-52/DEC.1, dated 20 July 2016) and Security Council resolution [2298 \(2016\)](#). On 23 November 2017, OPCW verified the complete destruction of the remnants of the category 2 chemical weapons at a certified waste treatment facility in Germany.

66. The clean-up operations at a former chemical weapons storage site in Libya, conducted with the assistance of OPCW, were completed in March 2020.

Iraq

67. Upon joining the Convention, in 2009, Iraq declared five former chemical weapons production facilities, four of which have been certified as destroyed. One

facility was converted for purposes not prohibited under the Convention and remains subject to verification. The Secretariat continues to verify the nature of the activities at this facility through on-site inspections.

Chemical weapons storage facility encapsulation

68. The Secretariat provided assistance to the Government of Iraq in the destruction of chemical weapons remnants in two bunkers, using concrete encapsulation. OPCW verified that both bunkers had been completely encapsulated as at 14 December 2017.

69. In addition to the assistance described above, the Secretariat, in cooperation with five States Parties, provided training to site workers to respond to medical emergencies and to handle, sample and transport contaminated material.

Technical assistance visits

70. The Secretariat has provided assistance to the Government of Iraq in response to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in that country. In September 2015, Iraq informed OPCW of the use of chemical weapons in its territory. Since then, OPCW has conducted three technical assistance visits: in 2015, 2016 and 2017. OPCW concluded that sulfur mustard had been used as a chemical weapon, and reports detailing the findings have been made available to the Government of Iraq to aid in its investigations.
