

**Statement by
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Before the fourth session of
the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
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**Thematic Discussions:
Nuclear Verification**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. President,

The landscape of nuclear verification demands a realistic appraisal. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often cited as the primary international body for this task, it's critical to acknowledge the absence of an agreed-upon mechanism within the IAEA for monitoring the destruction of nuclear weapons. This absence highlights the necessity for further discussions on utilizing existing mechanisms while identifying their weaknesses. The urgency of this issue becomes strikingly clear in regions like the Middle East, where the real presence of nuclear weapons underscores the need to create nuclear weapons-free zones.

Before delving into a detailed discussion, we believe that the real nuclear disarmament and dismantling the actual nuclear arsenal by Israel for example, will have to take place before joining to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon party and so to conclude a regional treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of all WMDs.

In pursuit of timely realization of this critical goal, it's vital to explore additional avenues for verification. Post-thematic discussions, a sustained and fruitful discourse must ensue, leading to a common understanding. This necessitates a referral to the Working Committee for a comprehensive resolution, involving technical experts from the IAEA and member states to effectively address existing gaps.

A brief overview of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) treaties and their respective organizations responsible for verification further illuminates the intricate web of oversight and the evident gaps in certain domains.

The existing discrimination within the IAEA is evident. Non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT commit to comprehensive safeguards agreements subject to rigorous verification and inspections as per Article III. Conversely, nuclear weapons states and non-parties to the NPT are exempted from these measures.

Notably, concerning precedents in IAEA verifications, there's a concerning deviation from the principle of "Trust and Verify" to an over-reliance on "Open Source" intelligence and politically motivated allegations. This shift jeopardizes national security, deviating the focus from verifying declared nuclear material to scrutinizing intelligence information, contrary to the spirit and letter of the IAEA Statute and the NPT.

In contrast, the OPCW treats all members equally, conducting verifications based on member state declarations, with mechanisms in place to address baseless allegations.

The application of IAEA verification in the Middle East reflects unequal treatment. While some nations face stringent inspections and sanctions, others possessing nuclear capabilities are exempt from scrutiny, contributing to an unjust status quo and threatening regional stability.

This prompts critical questions, and in conclusion of this intervention, I would like to leaving them with the Conference for further deliberations. The questions are as follows:

- Are these discrepancies hindering the realization of a "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East"?
- What non-nuclear weapon states collectively should take against these discriminations and breaches of confidentiality, aiming to rectify this unjust status quo?

I thank you, Mr. President.