



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
6 September 2023

Original: English

---

## Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Fourth session

New York, 13–17 November 2023

### Background document prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency

#### I. Introduction

1. On 21 August 2019, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) received a letter from the Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, extending an invitation to IAEA, on behalf of the Secretary-General, to attend the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, which was held from 18 to 22 November 2019 at Headquarters. The Conference was organized pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546, in which the Assembly requested IAEA to prepare background documents necessary for the Conference. IAEA provided background documentation detailing the work that it had previously undertaken on the application of its safeguards in the Middle East and the role of the Agency and its safeguards under treaties and regional arrangements related to nuclear-weapon-free zones. In addition, IAEA attended, as an observer, the first, second and third sessions of the Conference, held in November of 2019, 2021 and 2022, respectively, at Headquarters.

2. IAEA participated in other meetings related to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, such as the workshop held in February 2020 by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pathways forward, as well as two informal workshops of the Office for Disarmament Affairs on good practices and lessons learned with regard to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, held in July 2020 and February 2021, respectively, both organized in the run-up to the second session of the Conference. In September 2022, IAEA delivered a presentation on the status of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in the Middle East region at the first meeting of the working committee established by the Conference to undertake deliberations during the intersessional period. In March 2023, IAEA presented on the 2022 edition of the IAEA Safeguards



Glossary, on the topic “Glossary of terminologies”, at the second meeting of the working committee.

3. Pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546, the President of the third session of the Conference invited IAEA to submit the present background document for the consideration of the Conference at its fourth session.

4. A list of IAEA documents related to the application of safeguards in the Middle East is contained in annex 1. A list detailing the status of safeguards agreements, small quantities protocols and Additional Protocols for States<sup>1</sup> in the Middle East region<sup>2</sup> is contained in annex 2.

## II. Work previously undertaken by the Agency

5. In its resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/487,<sup>3</sup> adopted on 23 September 1988, the General Conference of IAEA requested the Director General, inter alia, to prepare a technical study on different modalities of application of IAEA safeguards in the region, taking into account the Agency’s experience in applying its safeguards.<sup>4</sup> It was the first such request of the General Conference.

6. In response to that request, in 1989, the Director General submitted to the General Conference a technical study prepared by the IAEA secretariat on the modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East (GC(XXXIII)/887). The technical study contained descriptions of the safeguards agreements concluded between IAEA and the States concerned and a comparison of the various types of safeguards agreements (ibid., para. 2).

7. In its resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/506, of 29 September 1989, the General Conference requested the Director General to consult with the States concerned in the Middle East area with a view to applying Agency safeguards to all nuclear installations in the area, keeping in mind the relevant recommendations contained in paragraph 75 of the report attached to document GC(XXXIII)/887 and the situation in the area of the Middle East, and to report on the matter to the Board of Governors and the General Conference at its thirty-fourth regular session.

8. Following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 43/65 on 7 December 1988, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on measures to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, discussions were held between IAEA and the United Nations on the subject in 1989 and 1990.

9. At its thirty-fifth session, in 1991, the item entitled “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” was included in the agenda of the General Conference for the first time (see GC(XXXV)/969, GC(XXXV)/969/Corr.1 and GC(XXXV)/952/Add.2/Rev.1), and the General Conference adopted the first resolution on the subject (GC(XXXV)/RES/571). In paragraph 2 of the resolution, the General Conference requested the Director General to take such measures as are necessary to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all

<sup>1</sup> The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

<sup>2</sup> Members of the League of Arab States, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Israel.

<sup>3</sup> Documents of IAEA are available at [www.iaea.org/publications/documents](http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents).

<sup>4</sup> In paragraph 6 of resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/487, the General Conference requested the Director General, pending the acceptance by Israel to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, to prepare a technical study on different modalities of application of IAEA safeguards in the region, taking into account the Agency’s experience in applying its safeguards.

nuclear activities in the Middle East, and in particular to prepare a model agreement taking into account the views of the States in the region, as a necessary step towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Following the adoption of that resolution, IAEA held consultations with the States of the Middle East.<sup>5</sup>

10. In the report of the Director General on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East (GC(XXXVI)/1019), submitted to the General Conference in 1992, he gave examples of the kinds of obligations which might be undertaken by two groups of States, namely, States of the region and nuclear-weapon States, in an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (*ibid.*, paras. 11–12). In the report, he identified possible verification requirements in such a zone, as well as the means of carrying out such verification (*ibid.*, paras 13–23). In a subsequent report on the subject, he recalled the need for some clarity on the part of States of the region with regard to the material obligations to be included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement (GOV/2682-GC(XXXVII)/1072, para. 3). The Director General indicated that IAEA might also arrange seminars to familiarize government officials in the States concerned with safeguards principles, practices and modalities in order to facilitate their choices of options for a future nuclear-weapon-free zone (GC(XXXVI)/1019, para. 8).

11. Pursuant to the mandate conferred upon the Director General by the General Conference by resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/601 to continue consultations with the States of the Middle East, IAEA convened a workshop in Vienna, from 4 to 7 May 1993, on the theme “Modalities for the application of safeguards in a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East”. Topics ranged from the general features of verification systems to detailed coverage of safeguards techniques and practices (GOV/2682-GC(XXXVII)/1072, para. 10).

12. In 1994, in fulfilment of the mandate conferred upon the Director General by resolution GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21, IAEA participated in the work of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East.<sup>6</sup>

13. Pursuant to decision GC(40)/DEC/15,<sup>7</sup> in which the General Conference requested the Director General to invite experts from the Middle East and other areas to a technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies and related experience, IAEA prepared a programme for such a workshop in consultation with parties concerned (GOV/2941-GC(41)/16, para. 8). The workshop was convened in Vienna from 12 to 15 May 1997 and had as its objective to deepen understanding about the IAEA safeguards system, its verification technologies and related experience (GOV/2941-GC(41)/16, para. 9). The workshop was focused, *inter alia*, on the process of verification *per se*, the IAEA safeguards system and its key parts, the capacity of IAEA to detect any undeclared nuclear material or facilities, transparency about States’ nuclear programmes and plans, the experience of IAEA and the lessons learned from the implementation of safeguards, and new verification technologies and issues (*ibid.*, paras. 11–14).

14. In its decision GC(41)/DEC/14, adopted in conjunction with resolution GC(41)/RES/25, the General Conference requested the Director General to invite experts from the Middle East and other areas to a technical workshop on safeguards,

<sup>5</sup> See GOV/2010/48-GC(54)/13, para. 14; GOV/2009/44-GC(53)/12, para. 11; GOV/2008/29/Rev.1-GC(52)/10/Rev.1, para. 12; GOV/2008/29-GC(52)/10, para. 12; GOV/2007/40-GC(51)/14, para. 13; GOV/2006/44-GC(50)/12, para. 13; GOV/2005/53-GC(49)/18, para. 14; GOV/2004/61-GC(48)/18, para. 14; GOV/2003/54-GC(47)/12, para. 16; GOV/2002/34-GC(46)/9, para. 14; GOV/2861-GC(40)/6, para. 8; and GOV/OR.787, para. 106.

<sup>6</sup> GOV/2682-GC(XXXVII)/1072, para. 11; GOV/2757-GC(XXXVIII)/18, paras 8–13; GOV/2825-GC(39)/20, paras 8-10; and GOV/2861-GC(40)/6, paras 7–8.

<sup>7</sup> See also GC(40)/RES/22.

verification technologies, and other related experience, including experience in various regional contexts. Pursuant to that request, IAEA prepared a programme for the workshop in consultation and coordination with the parties concerned. The technical workshop, which was the third of its kind, took place at IAEA headquarters from 11 to 13 May 1998. The aim of the workshop was to further increase understanding with regard to the origin, features and application of IAEA safeguards and other verification concepts, techniques and tools, as well as with regard to the lessons learned from catering for specific regional initiatives and needs, including those learned by IAEA through its verification of nuclear-weapon-free zones (GOV/1998/45-GC(42)/15, paras. 10–13, and GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17, para. 5).

15. On 22 September 2000, under the agenda item entitled “Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East”, the General Conference adopted decision GC(44)/DEC/12, in which it requested the Director General to make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence-building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In the decision, the General Conference also called upon the Director General, with States of the Middle East and other interested parties, to develop an agenda and modalities which would help to ensure a successful forum.

16. The Director General continued to seek the views of member States of the Middle East region with regard to developing an agenda and modalities for convening a forum and reported annually to the General Conference on the results of his consultations on the convening of such a forum. There continued to be differences of views, however, among States of the region. Following further consultations held in 2011, the Director General wrote to all member States on 31 August 2011 inviting them to take part in the Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, on 21 and 22 November 2011 at IAEA headquarters.

17. As described in the agenda (see GOV/2012/38-GC(56)/17, annex 1) circulated with the Director General’s letter, the Forum, reflecting the consensus of the Agency’s member States on the importance of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, was designed to consider the experience of Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean in creating regional security regimes and achieving disarmament through establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The principal focus of the Forum was to: (a) study the lessons of other regions regarding the regional setting and context that had prevailed there before they began considering a nuclear-weapon-free zone; (b) review the existing multilaterally agreed principles for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in populated areas of the world; (c) review the theory and practice of establishing the five existing nuclear-weapon-free zones; (d) discuss with representatives of the five existing nuclear-weapon-free zones their experience in promoting, negotiating and practically implementing negotiated arrangements for nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (e) discuss the region of the Middle East in that context. The potential relevance of such experience to the case and region of the Middle East was also addressed.

18. On 12 September 2011, in his introductory statement to the Board of Governors, the Director General announced that the Resident Representative of Norway to IAEA, Jan Petersen, had accepted his invitation to serve as Chairperson of the Forum.

19. The programme of the Forum (GOV/2012/38-GC(56)/17, annex 2), which was developed by the Chairperson in the course of his consultations, consisted of three plenary sessions. The Director General opened the Forum on 21 November 2011. During plenary session 1, the representatives of the five nuclear-weapon-free zones addressed the history and process of the establishment of their respective nuclear-

weapon-free zones in the light of related geopolitical circumstances and regional and international security settings (ibid., annex 3). They explained that the establishment of each nuclear-weapon-free zone had been a unique and lengthy endeavour that needed to address confidence-building, non-proliferation and transparency issues through flexible, and sometimes innovative, negotiating processes. Strong political will and commitment of the States involved were underlined as key elements. Technical and legal support by relevant international organizations, such as the United Nations and IAEA, were noted. The representatives of two regional verification arrangements, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, delivered presentations on their respective regional verification practices, and on the potential relevance of such experience to the case and region of the Middle East (GOV/2012/38-GC(56)/17, annex 3).

20. Following the seven presentations delivered at plenary session 1, the Forum was opened for discussion among the Forum participants and the panellists. The discussions were structured and scheduled to give priority to the member States of the Middle East region. Plenary session 2 was reserved for discussion among the States of the Middle East region and the presenters; in the discussion, issues of potential relevance of the experience of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and regional verification arrangements to the case and region of the Middle East were addressed. During plenary session 3, the discussion was broadened to include all IAEA member States. During plenary sessions 2 and 3, member States expressed an overall view of the usefulness of the Forum and their appreciation for the efforts of the Director General in convening it.

21. At the conclusion of the Forum on 22 November 2011, the Chairperson read out to the participants his summary of the Forum, the text of which is contained in annex 4 to the report of the Director General on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East (GOV/2012/38-GC(56)/17).

22. Following the Forum, the Director General continued his consultations in accordance with his mandate regarding the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities in the Middle East region. He also continued to encourage the development and consideration of relevant new ideas and approaches that could help to move the mandate forward.

23. Since taking office in December 2019, the Director General of IAEA, Rafael Mariano Grossi, has continued to consult and work with the States of the Middle East region to find the common ground required to develop the model agreements as a necessary step towards the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. During meetings with senior officials from States of the Middle East region and other member States, the Director General has underlined the importance of the early application of comprehensive Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East region. He has also recalled the Agency's contributions to advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and has expressed the availability of IAEA to continue to contribute to that process as appropriate and in line with the relevant resolutions of the IAEA General Conference. In addition, the Director General has called upon all countries that are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to adhere thereto.

### **III. Role of IAEA under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and regional verification arrangements**

24. In the five existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, the primary role of IAEA is verification of the States parties' compliance with their obligation to use nuclear

energy solely for peaceful purposes. The nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties rely on a legal framework for safeguards under which all States parties to those treaties conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA, which are equivalent in scope and effect to the agreements required under article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty) further requires States parties to conclude not only a comprehensive safeguards agreement but also an Additional Protocol.

25. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Semipalatinsk Treaty also include provisions requiring IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State, and some of the treaties, such as the Rarotonga Treaty, also require safeguards as a condition of supply to nuclear-weapon States. The Semipalatinsk Treaty additionally requires the conclusion of an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to a non-nuclear-weapon State.

26. Some of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties provide for a broader role for IAEA, such as the possibility of participation in fact-finding missions or inspections in the event that there is a complaint from a party about compliance with the treaty by another party. To date, those provisions have not been invoked by any party. The Pelindaba Treaty also anticipates a role for IAEA in the verification of the dismantling and destruction of nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production.

27. IAEA has provided legal advice and technical support at the request of the States involved on all relevant aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements, including treaty issues, safeguards and cooperation arrangements. The support has also included participation in meetings and workshops of the States parties, upon their request. IAEA also assists its member States that are parties to those treaties through its legislative assistance programme in developing and/or enhancing their respective national legal frameworks governing the peaceful, safe and secure use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation in order to bring them into line with the relevant international legal instruments, including those related to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

#### **A. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty)**

28. Under article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty, each contracting party is required to conclude multilateral or bilateral agreements with IAEA for the application of safeguards to its nuclear activities. Article 16.1 of the Treaty authorizes IAEA to carry out special inspections, in accordance with article 12 of the Treaty and in accordance with the safeguards agreements referred to in article 13 of the Treaty. An agreement between IAEA and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean provides for a framework of cooperation between the two organizations on matters of common interest.

29. The Tlatelolco Treaty also includes Additional Protocol I, which is open to all States which have territories within the zone of application of the Treaty for which they are, de jure or de facto, responsible, with respect to which States parties agree, inter alia, to conclude agreements for the application of safeguards to nuclear activities carried out in those territories.

30. The following States within the zone of application have received legislative assistance from IAEA through national workshops, bilateral legislative drafting assistance, participation in the Nuclear Law Institute and/or regional workshops: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of).

## **B. South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty)**

31. The Rarotonga Treaty was the first nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty concluded after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was therefore the first such treaty to require States parties to conclude safeguards agreements which are equivalent in scope and effect to those required in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was also the first nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to contain an explicit requirement of IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply in connection with exports by States parties of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. Pursuant to article 4 of the Rarotonga Treaty, in the case of exports to non-nuclear-weapon States, the safeguards called for are those required by article III.1 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; in the case of exports to nuclear-weapon States, the supply must be subject to applicable safeguards agreements with IAEA.

32. Under article 4 (b) of the Rarotonga Treaty, each party undertakes to support the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system.

33. In accordance with annex 2 to the Rarotonga Treaty, entitled “IAEA safeguards”, each State party agrees, upon the request of any other party, to transmit to that party and to the Director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation, for the information of all parties, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the party concerned and to advise the Director promptly of any subsequent findings of the Board of Governors of IAEA in relation to those conclusions for the information of all parties to the Treaty.

34. The following States within the zone of application have received legislative assistance from IAEA through national workshops, bilateral legislative drafting assistance, participation in the Nuclear Law Institute and/or regional workshops: Fiji, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.

## **C. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)**

35. Under article 5 of the Bangkok Treaty, each State party which has not done so is required to conclude an agreement with IAEA for the application of the full scope of safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities. The Bangkok Treaty also contains provisions similar to those contained in article 4 of the Rarotonga Treaty requiring Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards as a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States and requiring that any such exports to nuclear-weapon States be in conformity with applicable safeguards agreements with IAEA.

36. Article 8 of the Bangkok Treaty establishes a Commission for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Pursuant to article 18 of the Treaty, the Commission may conclude such agreements with IAEA or other international organizations as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by the Treaty, which includes, inter alia, the IAEA safeguards system. The annex to the Treaty, entitled “Procedure for a fact-finding mission”, provides for a further enhanced role of IAEA through its participation in any fact-finding mission triggered by a State party in order to clarify and resolve a situation which may be considered ambiguous or which may give rise to doubts about compliance with the Treaty.

37. The following States within the zone of application have received legislative assistance from IAEA through national workshops, bilateral legislative drafting assistance, participation in the Nuclear Law Institute and/or regional workshops: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.

#### **D. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)**

38. In response to a request by the United Nations in 1993, IAEA assisted the group of experts designated by the United Nations, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, by preparing draft treaty provisions relevant to verification requirements for a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. A senior official of the Agency participated in the meetings of the group of experts and assisted in the development of those provisions. Upon request by the United Nations, IAEA participated in a further meeting of the group of experts in Pelindaba, South Africa, during which the group reached agreement on the draft text of a treaty establishing an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. For the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Pelindaba Treaty, article 12 thereof provides for the establishment of an African Commission on Nuclear Energy. IAEA also provided advice and support for the eventual launch of the Commission.

39. The Pelindaba Treaty requires that each State party conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Under annex II to the Treaty, entitled “Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency”, the safeguards agreement required under the Treaty shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, the agreement required in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

40. States parties to the Treaty undertake not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA.

41. Article 6 of the Pelindaba Treaty also envisages a role for IAEA in verifying the processes of dismantling and destruction of nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production.

42. Annex IV to the Pelindaba Treaty, which details the procedures in connection with complaints and the settlement of disputes, envisages IAEA inspection, at the request of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, should the Commission consider that there is sufficient substance in a complaint made by a State party to the Treaty that another State party is in breach of its obligations under the Treaty to warrant an inspection in the territory of the latter party. The IAEA inspection team may be accompanied by Commission representatives and representatives from the inspected State. IAEA is to report its findings in writing as quickly as possible to the Commission, outlining its activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by it, with supporting evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating its conclusions. States parties agree to include in their annual report to the



Commission a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by IAEA on its inspection activities in their territory and to promptly advise the Commission of any changes to those conclusions.

43. The Pelindaba Treaty also includes Protocol III, which is open to all States which have territories within the zone of application of the Treaty for which they are, de jure or de facto, responsible, with respect to which those States agree, inter alia, to ensure the application of safeguards specified in annex II to the Treaty.

44. The following States in the zone of application have received legislative assistance from IAEA through national workshops, bilateral legislative drafting assistance, participation in the Nuclear Law Institute and/or regional workshops: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

#### **E. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty)**

45. Upon request of the Central Asian States and the United Nations, IAEA participated in expert meetings and provided legal and technical input on a variety of issues during the negotiations on and drafting of the Semipalatinsk Treaty.

46. Under the Semipalatinsk Treaty, each party is required to conclude with IAEA an agreement for the application of safeguards in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as noted above, an Additional Protocol. States parties also undertake not to provide any source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless that State has concluded with IAEA both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol.

47. The following States within the zone of application of the Semipalatinsk Treaty have received legislative assistance from IAEA through national workshops, bilateral legislative drafting assistance, participation in the Nuclear Law Institute and/or regional workshops: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

#### **F. Regional verification arrangements**

48. IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to safeguards agreements to which regional verification organizations are also parties, as indicated below.

##### **The European Atomic Energy Community**

49. Within the European Union, IAEA safeguards are implemented under three agreements: a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty between IAEA, the European Atomic Energy Community and the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union (INFCIRC/193), and two voluntary offer safeguards agreements concluded between IAEA, the Community and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (INFCIRC/263) and between IAEA, the Community and France (INFCIRC/290), respectively. Each of the agreements includes a protocol on cooperation between the Community and IAEA to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards set out in the agreements.

**Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials**

50. Under the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (INFCIRC/395), of 1991, the States parties undertook to use the nuclear material and facilities under their jurisdiction or control exclusively for peaceful purposes. Pursuant to the Agreement, they also established a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. In December 1991, Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and IAEA signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/435), which entered into force in March 1994. The safeguards agreement also satisfies the obligation of Argentina and Brazil under article 13 of the Tlatelolco Treaty and article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (see INFCIRC/435/Mod.1, Mod.2 and Mod.3).

51. The safeguards agreement also includes a protocol on cooperation between IAEA and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials.

**Annex I****Documents of the International Atomic Energy Agency related to the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Document symbol<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Title/description</i>
1988	GC(XXXII)/RES/487	Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 23 September 1988
1989	GOV/INF/568	Modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East
	GOV/2418-GC(XXXIII)/886	Report of the Director General on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat
	GC(XXXIII)/887	Note by the Director General on the modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXIII)/RES/506	Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 29 September 1989
1990	GOV/INF/584	Modalities of application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXIV)/926	Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat
	GC(XXXIV)/RES/526	Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 21 September 1990
1991	GOV/2511	Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXV)/960	Report of the Director General on Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXV)/RES/571	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 1991
1992	GC(XXXVI)/1019	Report of the Director General on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXVI)/RES/601	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 25 September 1992
	GC(XXXVI)/DEC/9	Israeli nuclear capabilities and threat, decision adopted by the General Conference on 22 September 1992
1993	GOV/2682- GC(XXXVII)/1072	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXVII)/RES/627	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 1 October 1993
1994	GOV/2757-GC(XXXVIII)/18	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 23 September 1994

<i>Year</i>	<i>Document symbol<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Title/description</i>
1995	GOV/2825-GC(39)/20	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(39)/RES/24	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 22 September 1995
1996	GOV/2861-GC(40)/6 and GOV/2861-GC(40)/6/Add.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addendum thereto
	GC(40)/DEC/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, decision adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 1996
	GC(40)/RES/22	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 1996
1997	GOV/2941-GC(41)/16	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(41)/DEC/14	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, decision adopted by the General Conference on 3 October 1997
	GC(41)/RES/25	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 3 October 1997
1998	GOV/1998/45-GC(42)/15	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(42)/RES/21	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 25 September 1998
1999	GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17, GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17/Add.1, GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17/Add.1/Corr.1 and GOV/1999/51-GC(43)/17/Add.2	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addenda thereto
	GC(43)/RES/23	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 1 October 1999
2000	GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14 and GOV/2000/38-GC(44)/14/Corr.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(44)/DEC/12	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, decision adopted by the General Conference on 22 September 2000
	GC(44)/RES/28	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 22 September 2000
2001	GOV/2001/36-GC(45)/19 and GOV/2001/36-GC(45)/19/Corr.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East

<i>Year</i>	<i>Document symbol<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Title/description</i>
	GC(45)/RES/18	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 21 September 2001
2002	GOV/2002/34-GC(46)/9, GOV/2002/34-GC(46)/9/Corr.1, GOV/2002/34-GC(46)/9/Add.1 and GOV/2002/34-GC(46)/9/Add.2	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addenda thereto
	GC(46)/RES/16	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 2002
2003	GOV/2003/54-GC(47)/12 and GOV/2003/54-GC(47)/12/Add.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addendum thereto
	GC(47)/RES/13	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 19 September 2003
2004	GOV/2004/61-GC(48)/18 and GOV/2004/61-GC(48)/18/Add.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addendum thereto
	GC(48)/RES/16	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 24 September 2004
2005	GOV/2005/53-GC(49)/18	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(49)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 30 September 2005
2006	GOV/2006/44-GC(50)/12	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(50)/RES/16	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 22 September 2006
2007	GOV/2007/40-GC(51)/14	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(51)/RES/17	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 2007
2008	GOV/2008/29/Rev.1-GC(52)/10/Rev.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(52)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 4 October 2008

<i>Year</i>	<i>Document symbol<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Title/description</i>
2009	GOV/2009/44-GC(53)/12, GOV/2009/44-GC(53)/12/ Corr.1 and GOV/2009/44- GC(53)/12/Add.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addendum thereto
	GC(53)/RES/16	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 17 September 2009
2010	GOV/2010/48-GC(54)/13	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(54)/RES/13	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 24 September 2010
2011	GOV/2011/55-GC(55)/23	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(55)/RES/14	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 23 September 2011
2012	GOV/2012/38-GC(56)/17	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(56)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 2012
2013	GOV/2013/33-GC(57)/10 and GOV/2013/33- GC(57)/10/Add.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and the addendum thereto
	GC(57)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 2013
2014	GOV/2014/45-GC(58)/15	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(58)/RES/16	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 25 September 2014
2015	GOV/2015/45-GC(59)/15	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(59)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 17 September 2015
2016	GOV/2016/40/Rev.1- GC(60)/14/Rev.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(60)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 29 September 2016

<i>Year</i>	<i>Document symbol<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Title/description</i>
2017	GOV/2017/32-GC(61)/15	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(61)/RES/14	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 21 September 2017
2018	GOV/2018/38-GC(62)/6	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(62)/RES/12	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 20 September 2018
2019	GOV/2019/35-GC(63)/14 and GOV/2019/35-GC(63)/14/Corr.1	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(63)/RES/13	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 19 September 2019
2020	GOV/2020/38-GC(64)/11	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(64)/RES/15	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 24 September 2020
2021	GOV/2021/36-GC(65)/14	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(65)/RES/14	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 23 September 2021
2022	GOV/2022/43-GC(66)/12	Report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and the General Conference on the application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East
	GC(66)/RES/12	Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East, resolution adopted by the General Conference on 29 September 2022

<sup>a</sup> Documents of IAEA are available at [www.iaea.org/publications/documents](http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents).

## Annex II

**Status of the conclusion of safeguards agreements, small quantities protocols and Additional Protocols for States of the Middle East region, as at 31 August 2023**

<i>State<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Small quantities protocol<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Safeguards agreement</i>	<i>Information circular</i>	<i>Additional Protocol</i>
Algeria		In force: 7 January 1997	INFCIRC/531	Signed: 16 February 2018
Bahrain	In force: 10 May 2009	In force: 10 May 2009	INFCIRC/767	In force: 20 July 2011
Comoros	In force: 20 January 2009	In force: 20 January 2009	INFCIRC/752	In force: 20 January 2009
Djibouti	In force: 26 May 2015	In force: 26 May 2015	INFCIRC/884	In force: 26 May 2015
Egypt		In force: 30 June 1982	INFCIRC/302	
Iran (Islamic Republic of) <sup>c</sup>		In force: 15 May 1974	INFCIRC/214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Iraq		In force: 29 February 1972	INFCIRC/172	In force: 10 October 2012
Israel*		In force: 4 April 1975	INFCIRC/249/Add.1	
Jordan		In force: 21 February 1978	INFCIRC/258	In force: 28 July 1998
Kuwait	Amended: 26 July 2013	In force: 7 March 2002	INFCIRC/607	In force: 2 June 2003
Lebanon	Amended: 5 September 2007	In force: 5 March 1973	INFCIRC/191	
Libya		In force: 8 July 1980	INFCIRC/282	In force: 11 August 2006
Mauritania	Amended: 20 March 2013	In force: 10 December 2009	INFCIRC/788	In force: 10 December 2009
Morocco		In force: 18 February 1975	INFCIRC/228	In force: 21 April 2011
Oman	X	In force: 5 September 2006	INFCIRC/691	
Qatar	In force: 21 January 2009	In force: 21 January 2009	INFCIRC/747	
Saudi Arabia	X	In force: 13 January 2009	INFCIRC/746	
<i>Somalia</i>				



<i>State<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Small quantities protocol<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Safeguards agreement</i>	<i>Information circular</i>	<i>Additional Protocol</i>
State of Palestine <sup>d</sup>	In force: 7 September 2022	In force: 7 September 2022	INFCIRC/1050	
Sudan	Amended: 19 February 2021	In force: 7 January 1977	INFCIRC/245	
Syrian Arab Republic		In force: 18 May 1992	INFCIRC/407	
Tunisia		In force: 13 March 1990	INFCIRC/381	Signed: 24 May 2005
United Arab Emirates		In force: 9 October 2003	INFCIRC/622	In force: 20 December 2010
Yemen	X	In force: 14 August 2002	INFCIRC/614	

*Note:* The table is not aimed at listing all safeguards agreements that the Agency has concluded. Not included are agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended upon the entry into force of a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Unless otherwise indicated, the safeguards agreements referred to are comprehensive safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

*Italics:* State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that has not yet brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement pursuant to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

\* State not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose safeguards agreements are of the INFCIRC/66 type.

X An X in the small quantities protocol column indicates that the State has an operative small quantities protocol. “Amended” or “In force”, in the same column, indicates that the operative small quantities protocol is based on the revised standard text of the small quantities protocol.

<sup>a</sup> An entry in this column does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

<sup>b</sup> Provided that they meet certain eligibility criteria, including that the quantities of nuclear material do not exceed the limits set out in paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153(Corrected), countries have the option to conclude a small quantities protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreements that holds in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions set out in part II of the comprehensive safeguards agreements as long as eligibility criteria continue to apply. This column contains countries whose comprehensive safeguards agreement with a small quantities protocol based on the original standard text has been approved by the Board of Governors and for which, as far as the secretariat is aware, those eligibility criteria continue to apply. For those States that have accepted the revised standard text, approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 2005, the current status is reflected.

<sup>c</sup> On 16 January 2016, as notified in its letter to the Director General of 7 January 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran began to provisionally apply its Additional Protocol in accordance with article 17 (b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The Additional Protocol, which had been provisionally applied by the Islamic Republic of Iran from 16 January 2016, has not been applied since 23 February 2021.

<sup>d</sup> The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.