



General Assembly

Seventy-second session

First Committee

14th meeting

Monday, 16 October 2017, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Bahr Aluloom (Iraq)

In the absence of the Chair, Mr. Sparber (Liechtenstein), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 52 (b) and 90 to 106 (continued)

Thematic discussions on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Acting Chair: In accordance with our programme of work and timetable, the Committee is scheduled to begin its consideration of the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction this morning. However, we still have a total of 19 speakers remaining on the list for the nuclear weapons cluster and we will first hear from them before moving to the next item.

All delegations taking the floor are reminded to observe the speaking limits of five minutes for national statements and seven minutes for those speaking on behalf of groups. The buzzer will continue to remind delegations when the time limit has been reached.

Mr. Przenioslo (Poland): At the outset, let me say that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are an important element of Poland's security policy. We share the commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and believe that we need concerted action in order to achieve that goal.

While Poland fully subscribes to the statements delivered by the representative of Australia on behalf of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative

and group of 29 States (see A/C.1/72/PV.10), we would like to share some elements of our national views, which should be seriously taken into account in our deliberations.

The nuclear-disarmament process largely depends on the regional security environment. We cannot ignore geopolitical realities. Recent months have brought us alarming developments in the situation in North-East Asia. We are concerned about the growing tensions on the Korean peninsula due to the provocative actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programmes pose a serious threat to the security and stability of the region. Poland is also concerned about the growing risk of the proliferation of sensitive technologies to other States or non-State actors. We have strongly condemned the nuclear and intercontinental ballistic-missile tests conducted by Pyongyang, which are giving a new dimension to the threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and require a strong response from the international community.

In that context, I would like to bring up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which seems to be the best deal we can have under these challenging circumstances. In our opinion, it should remain in force despite its imperfections. It allows for robust verification measures, as well as for decreasing the number of centrifuges in Iran and making it possible to ship excessive stocks of low enriched uranium out of the country, thereby contributing to de-escalation and stability.

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while outwardly claiming an unverifiable commitment to disarmament. It also risks weakening the CTBT and its prospects for universalization. That is why today we want to issue a warning about the political, legal and institutional risks that the new prohibition Treaty presents. No State should take the sovereign decision on whether to accede to the Treaty without a full understanding of those serious risks.

Mr. Deyneko (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I shall read out an abridged version of a statement on behalf of Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov, who was to deliver it on 13 October. The full text will be published on the First Committee website.

Russia shares the goal of building a world free of nuclear weapons and has been making a major contribution to it for the past 30 years. We have reduced our total quantity of strategic offensive weapons more than sixfold. We have reduced our non-strategic weapons by 75 per cent and moved them into our non-deployed category. Taken as a whole, this represents full-on de-alerting with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons. We have introduced a concept of non-nuclear deterrence into our military doctrine that reduces the role of nuclear force in national security even further. As a result, our overall number of nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, has been reduced many times over.

The nuclear-arms race between Russia and the United States has not only been halted but reversed, as provided for in the first part of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is astonishing that this fact has not been noted by those who continue to insist there has been no progress, or not enough, in nuclear disarmament. Russia has repeatedly reaffirmed its willingness at the highest levels to have a substantive dialogue on further reductions in nuclear weapons. However, in order to do that, one has to ensure that each successive stage contributes to strengthening the peace and security of all States, without exception, and definitely not the opposite. We have to take into account the totality of the factors affecting global strategic stability, especially considering the sharply deteriorating geopolitical circumstances that many delegations have mentioned. One such step could be ensuring the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. There are also other difficult, potentially destabilizing issues that need solutions, such as the deployment of global ballistic-missile-defence systems, the risk of the placement of weapons in outer space and so forth.

These growing challenges and threats are affecting disarmament processes and make finding collective responses essential. Among other things in that regard, Russia has consistently called for launching a multilateral dialogue with the participation of all States possessing military nuclear capabilities. We understand the views of those who call for an immediate renunciation of nuclear weapons. However, the way they have chosen to do it, by instituting a ban on nuclear weapons, is fundamentally wrong and counterproductive from the point of view of the prospects for nuclear disarmament. My delegation gave its opinion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons during the discussions on it. We did not question the possibility or even the need for a ban on nuclear weapons as an effective measure under article VI of the NPT at a final stage of the multilateral nuclear-disarmament process, which would make the process irreversible. At the moment, however, such a step is patently premature.

We would also like to draw attention to the fact that under article VI of the NPT, the final liquidation of nuclear arsenals must be carried out in accordance with the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control. The drafters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons have somehow forgotten that important provision. In general, a constructive and results-oriented dialogue on nuclear-disarmament issues is simply impossible without taking account of security considerations, abiding by the rule of consensus and guaranteeing a balance of everyone's interests. Those are the fundamentals of effective multilateral diplomacy, which we urge the States Members of the United Nations to be guided by when addressing issues of international security and stability that current circumstances render so complex.

We congratulate the States of Latin American and the Caribbean on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. The Russian Federation has adhered to all of the protocols to the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and has strictly complied with its obligations. We are also ready to sign the protocols of the Bangkok Treaty.

As a sponsor of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, we have given special attention to the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We regret that the process has been deadlocked and

intend to do everything we can to move it out of this impasse. In that regard, Russia has proposed convening a conference in 2020 on regional security issues in the Middle East, creating a preparatory committee and doing the necessary preparatory work with the help of the permanent members of the Security Council. We realize that the countries of the region will need time to consider our initiative and we do not intend to force it through, but the proposal will remain on the table.

Lastly, the decision of the President of the United States not to certify Tehran's good-faith implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme is regrettable. Rather than calling the results of the JCPOA implementation into question, we should be focusing on fully realizing all of its potential. That is in our common interest. Regardless of the decisions by any individual participants in the JCPOA, there can be no returning to the situation that existed before its adoption. In any event, any sanctions through the Security Council are definitely out of the question.

The full text of this statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry is published on its website.

Mr. Kim In Ryong (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): At the outset, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of the Republic of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/72/PV.10).

It is a long-cherished aspiration of humankind to live in a peaceful and secure world without war or nuclear threats. The United Nations was established to realize that aspiration, even if peace and security continue to be the main topic under consideration at the United Nations, more than 70 years after its founding. More than half a century later, the reality that we are witnessing today is totally different from what we had hoped. Instead of getting closer to building a world free of nuclear weapons, we are moving away from it. In July, on an initiative in which non-nuclear-weapon States played a leading role, the United Nations adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which makes legal provision for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has consistently supported the total elimination of nuclear weapons and efforts to denuclearize the entire world. However, as long as the United States, which constantly

threatens and blackmails the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over nuclear weapons, rejects the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not be in a position to accede to it. In order to ensure the success of nuclear-disarmament efforts, the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in dismantling nuclear weapons, roll back aggressive nuclear doctrines such as pre-emptive strikes and withdraw nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territory.

The situation on the Korean peninsula, which the attention of the world is focused on, is at a crucial juncture. A nuclear war could break out at any moment. In 1957, the United States deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea. Every year since 1970, it has carried out large-scale nuclear exercises involving nuclear assets. In March and April, the United States staged its largest-ever joint military exercise for mounting a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the participation of 300,000 troops and all sorts of strategic assets, including aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines.

On several occasions, the United States has also dispatched strategic bombers stationed in Guam to sensitive military-demarcation-line areas on the Korean peninsula in order to run nuclear-bombing simulations. What is more dangerous is that it has dared to formulate a plan and stage the exercise of a secret decapitation operation aimed at removing our supreme leadership. That is an intolerable insult to the supreme dignity of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and has seriously angered our people and service personnel. No country in the world has been subjected to such an extreme and direct nuclear threat from the United States over such a long period or experienced at its own front door nuclear-war exercises that are extraordinarily vicious and brutal in their scale, form and purpose.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles is a justified measure in self-defence against the clear and concrete nuclear threat posed by the United States. To the Korean people, who have lived through the disastrous results of war on their land at the hands of the United States, a powerful military deterrent in defence of their State is an inevitable strategic option and a precious strategic asset that cannot be reversed or bartered away. Unless the United States completely eliminates its hostile policies and nuclear threat, we