

Islamic Republic of **I R A N**

Permanent Mission to the United Nations

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Statement by

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to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Vienna
at the Main Committee II of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New York, 4 May 2015**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I congratulate you for your chairmanship and assure you of our full cooperation. I also would like to associate my delegation with the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Nuclear weapons, as the most horrendous, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever developed, are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in time and space, and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations, and indeed to the very survival of humanity. As it is commonly agreed at the global level, the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination and assuring that they will never be produced again. Accordingly, nuclear disarmament remains the main objective and the highest priority.

Based on this assumption, we believe that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as an internationally accepted interim measure, drives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can neither be regarded as an independent objective nor be reduced only to preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States. We recognize the importance of the non-proliferation objective and the accomplishments made in this field. However, in the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, overemphasizing the non-proliferation at the price of nuclear disarmament, and as if the Treaty has no other objective than non-proliferation is both misleading and counterproductive.

We share the view that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing. However, they can be regarded mutually reinforcing only if the non-proliferation efforts are accompanied by parallel practical steps aimed at nuclear disarmament. Likewise, to be effective, nuclear non-proliferation measures shall in no way restrict the exercise of the inalienable right of the States parties to use and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

We believe that reviewing the implementation status of the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty should be carried out, inter alia, in light of the actual progress in the areas of preventing: horizontal and vertical proliferation, upgrading the existing nuclear weapons, developing new types of such weapons and their means of delivery, construction of new facilities for the production of nuclear-weapons or their means of delivery, nuclear-weapon-sharing with other countries and assisting other States, directly or indirectly, to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the establishment and promoting the effectiveness of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and nuclear-weapon-free status of concerned countries, realizing the universality of the Treaty, and providing universal effective unconditional legally binding assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances.

In view of these observations, the Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to achieving the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the full and non-discriminatory implementation of relevant provisions of the Treaty, as well as the relevant parts of the final documents of its Review Conferences.

In our view, nuclear-weapon-sharing between the nuclear-weapon States themselves, and between them and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty - the living example of which is the nuclear-weapon-sharing within a certain military alliance - are clear violations of the explicit obligations of concerned States parties under articles I and II of the Treaty. The Review Conference should address this violation which undermines the credibility of the Treaty and make practical decisions to rectify it.

Mr. Chairman,

The ongoing measures and plans of all nuclear-weapon States to modernize or upgrade their nuclear weapon arsenals, and of certain nuclear-weapon States to develop new types of such weapons, including new types of tactical nuclear weapons - that reduces the threshold for their use and increases the possibility and risk of their use - are other sources of grave concern in regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This trend continues to adversely affect the effectiveness of the Treaty and undermine its object and purpose and needs to be addressed by the Review Conference.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that only those non-proliferation measures can be considered effective and in line with the realization of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that are carried out in parallel to each other, and in practice, prevent completely the spread of nuclear weapons to geographical areas beyond the territories of the nuclear-weapon States, halt assisting, directly or indirectly, other countries, whether party or non-party to the Treaty, to manufacture or otherwise acquire or take control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and prevent the development of any new types of nuclear weapons or upgrading the existing nuclear weapons - as it would be paradoxical to prevent the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduce their number, but preserve the same or even higher destructive power. What essentially matters in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, is not preventing only their spread or reducing their number; it is limiting their geographical scope, number, destructive power, and the possibility of their use. Therefore, to be effective, non-proliferation measures, in addition to limiting the geographical scope of the nuclear weapons, should reduce the number and destructive power of such weapons and the possibility of their use too.

At the same time, as the ultimate objective of all nuclear non-proliferation measures

are nuclear disarmament, which itself is “the most effective measure against the proliferation of nuclear weapons”, they should result in advancing the overall objective of nuclear disarmament.

One of the alarming trends in the implementation of the Treaty and in its Review Conferences is the attempt, by certain States parties and using non-proliferation as a pretext, aimed at restricting, directly or indirectly, the exercise of the inalienable right of the States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As the Treaty clearly states “nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination”. Therefore, all such measures should be considered as clear violations of the letter and spirit and object and purpose of the Treaty, and its persistence, with no doubt, would continue to hamper the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment, which, according to the Treaty, shall be avoided by all the parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that, even no genuine non-proliferation measure can and should limit or suspend, partly or in full, any element of the inalienable right of all the Parties under article IV of the Treaty, let alone using non-proliferation as a pretext to violate this right.

Mr. Chairman,

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world and creating a nuclear-weapon-free status by a certain country, which led to the absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territory of that State and those parties to the treaties establishing such zones, are indeed other achievements in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, they neither substitute other non-proliferation measures, nor the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. At the same, they are not enough for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Other challenges in regard to such zones are, inter alia, the abstention of certain nuclear-weapon States from granting full, effective, non-discriminatory, unconditional and irrevocable legally binding security assurances to all the parties to treaties establishing these zones against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, as well as the absence of political will by certain non-parties to the Treaty in support of the establishment of such zones in other parts of the world. The refusal of the Israeli regime to participate in the implementation of the resolutions and decisions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is a living example in this context.

The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to, and strongly supports, the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, the idea of which was first presented by Iran in 1974. Moreover, Iran supported the adoption of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan for its implementation. Since then, Iran has called for timely implementation of the plan of action which included, inter alia, an agreement to convene a regional conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Iran also took many steps to that end, some of which are reflected in its national report submitted to the 2015 Review Conference.

One day after the conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference, Israeli regime, in its statement of 29 May 2010, totally rejected the 2010 Final Document as “deeply flawed” and stated that “Israel will not be able to take part in its implementation.”

Like all the other States parties to the NPT in the Middle East, Iran constructively engaged in several rounds of consultations with the facilitator of the Conference in preparation process for the 2012 conference. On 6 November 2012, Iran officially declared its decision to participate in the Helsinki conference which was scheduled to be convened in December 2012.

While expressing deep concern and disappointment over the failure of the conveners of the 2012 conference to accomplish the mandate entrusted to them by the 2010 Review Conference, Iran strongly rejects all justifications raised by certain conveners for not convening the Conference. The failure to convene the conference in 2012, violates the collective agreement of the States parties reached at the 2010 Review Conference and contravenes the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The conveners, in particular the three cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, are called upon to be accountable to the 2015 Review Conference.

The Israeli regime's intransigent opposition to any international effort under the United Nations auspices for the establishment of a Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons continues to be the main obstacle in convening the Helsinki conference. It is crystal clear that why Israeli regime was not and still is not willing to participate in such a conference, the sole objective of which is the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. Because, the establishment of such a zone, first and foremost requires prompt and unconditional accession of Israel as a non-nuclear weapon party, to the NPT, thereby renouncing possession of its nuclear weapons and placing all of its clandestine nuclear activities and facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

A short look at the practices of Israel in the Middle East region and its records in the field of disarmament and international security provides a clear picture about the seriousness of security threat posed by this regime against peace and security in the Middle East, and proves, once again, that how essential and urgent the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction is for the maintenance of peace and security in the region and beyond. They include, but not limited to, the following: during its lifetime, the Israeli regime has waged 17 wars, which means one war almost every 4 years; committed aggression against all of its neighbours, without exception; attacked even several other non-neighbouring countries in the region and beyond; attacked the peaceful nuclear installations of two States parties to the Treaty in the Middle East, in one case of which, the United Nation Security Council strongly condemned the military attack by Israel as a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct; threatened to attack the IAEA-safeguarded peaceful nuclear facilities of States parties to the Treaty in the region; still have under occupation the territories of several neighbouring countries insofar as it is called, by the United Nations resolutions, as the "Occupying Power"; is not party to the non-proliferation Treaty or any other international instrument banning weapons of mass destruction, in defiance of repeated calls by the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the IAEA General Conference, Review Conferences of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, summit and ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation; and is the only one in the region that is estimated to possess hundreds of nuclear warheads and all other types of weapons of mass destruction.

As stated, time and again, by the summit and ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, "stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in

military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours, and the region”.

According to the aforementioned facts, Israel is the only obstacle for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. This regime is not willing even to respond positively to repeated calls of the international community, and to participate in a conference, the exclusive agenda and purpose of which is the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, let alone its prompt and unconditional accession, as a non-nuclear weapon party, to the NPT which is one of the main requirements of the establishment of such a zone.

Given such realities, the only way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is to exert and maintain, by the international community, a sustained pressure on Israel in order to compel it to accede, promptly and unconditionally as a non-nuclear weapon party, to the Treaty and to place all of its nuclear activities and installations under the IAEA full-scope safeguards. This approach was followed by the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences when it reaffirmed “the importance of Israel’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards”.

The realization of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty requires, in addition to the full and non-discriminatory implementation of all obligations under this instrument, the prompt and full implementation of the decisions taken by the Review Conferences, specially the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East.

Therefore, the 2015 Review Conference should agree on concrete steps for the speedy implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East. In this context, the 2015 Review Conference is recommended to consider the urgent implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East. The 1995 Resolution or the 2010 plan of action constitute the basis for the 2015 Review Conference in developing a plan of action and a timetable for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, Iran is of the view that prompt convening of a conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should be addressed and agreed upon in the 2015 Review Conference. Convening of such a conference shall not be held hostage to preconditions.

Mr. Chairman,

Having said that, my delegation proposes that the 2015 Review Conference should incorporate the following elements in its decision on the Middle East and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons:

To reaffirm the urgent need for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and the 2010 action plan on the Middle East;

To renew the strong resolve of all States parties to the Treaty to undertake all necessary measures aimed at the prompt and full implementation of 1995 Resolution and 2010 plan of action;

To express appreciation for the constructive engagement and the positive reactions of all States parties to the Treaty in the region towards the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which

was scheduled to be held in 2012, including the announcement of their decisions to participate therein;

To express deep concern and disappointment over the fact that due only to the unwillingness of Israel to participate, the aforesaid conference was not convened;

To reaffirm the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear activities and facilities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards;

To establish a standing committee comprising the members of the Bureau of the Review Conference to follow up the implementation of the recommendations by the Review Conference concerning Israel's prompt accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, and to report to the 2020 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

To reaffirm the commitment of States parties to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

To Reaffirm that full and effective implementation of the obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty is essential for achieving the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the universality of the Treaty;

To confirm the continued validity of all decisions on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons agreed to at the Review Conferences of the Treaty until all their objectives are achieved;

To confirm the commitment of concerned nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to the nuclear-weapon-sharing;

To confirm also the commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to cease completely and no later than 2020, all plans aimed at upgrading and refurbishing their existing nuclear weapon systems and their means of delivery, developing new types of nuclear weapon systems and constructing any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and abroad;

To underline that States parties to the Treaty, in conformity with its provisions, shall avoid using non-proliferation, as a means to impose restrictions or limitations on the peaceful nuclear activities of other States parties, including the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.