
**Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**Matters relating to implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic

**I. The position of the Syrian Arab Republic on the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

1. The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first States to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, and stresses its continued commitment to its international undertakings pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, which it considers central to the non-proliferation regime, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear power. It stresses that nuclear weapons and the continued acquisition and development thereof in any part of the world do not accord with the lofty goals that the Treaty aspires to achieve.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Preparatory Committees face onerous tasks, given that several States continue to provide assistance, information and nuclear technology to non-Parties to the Treaty.

II. The universality of the Treaty

3. Israel's obduracy in not acceding to the Treaty and the fact that, to date, it has given no indication that it will accede thereto or place its nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safeguards system, while all the Arab States have become Parties to the Treaty, have made the Middle East one of the most contradictory regions in the world. That situation underlines the need to take genuine action to contribute to the realization of security and stability in the Middle Eastern region, namely, to bring pressure to bear on Israel, the only State in the region that possesses military nuclear capacities that are not subject to any international oversight, to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear Party and open all its nuclear installations to the international inspection associated with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards system.



4. It should be stressed that it is important for the international community to appreciate the danger posed by Israeli nuclear capacities, which have been developed and extended without any international oversight. Nuclear States Parties must shoulder their responsibilities in accordance with their comprehensive undertaking with regard to the provisions of the Treaty and halt their direct or indirect transfer to Israel of nuclear weapons or nuclear delivery systems, and should not assist Israel in any way in matters related to its nuclear capabilities.

5. If the Treaty is to be universal, Israel must, without delay, implement all the relevant resolutions of international legitimacy, which will constitute an important factor in confidence-building and a major step towards achieving regional and international peace and security. Those resolutions include Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and, in particular, paragraph 5 thereof, which calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the two IAEA resolutions Nos. GC(53)/RES/17, adopted in 2009, entitled Israeli nuclear capabilities, and GC(55)/RES/14 of 2011, entitled Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East; and General Assembly resolution 66/61 of 2011, entitled The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, which recalls that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

6. It must be emphasized that all nuclear weapon States should stop supplying Israel with any form of nuclear technology and also cease obstruction of consideration of the Israeli nuclear file, which contravenes international legitimacy. As the only body empowered to implement the verification regime, IAEA should, in accordance with the provisions of its Statute, take genuine and balanced steps in that regard, applying standards that are neither selective nor hypocritical.

III. The peaceful uses of nuclear power

7. The provisions must be emphasized of article IV of the Treaty, which grants all the Parties to the Treaty the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in a manner that maintains a balance between their rights and responsibilities. Given that inalienable right, it should be emphasized that nothing in the Treaty can be interpreted as affecting the right of States Parties to apply the peaceful uses of nuclear power; the provisions merely aim to realize the goals of the Treaty, maintain its credibility and ensure that it is not exploited.

8. It is important to emphasize that the basic role of IAEA as set forth in its Statute must be maintained. That role is to support the use of nuclear technology in the various peaceful applications; to facilitate the interchange of information, equipment, materials, and scientific and technological services for the purposes of the peaceful use of nuclear power; and to encourage and assist States Parties in carrying out scientific research for peaceful purposes. The hopes of all the States Parties and, in particular, those of developing countries, depend on this important role. It should also be emphasized that the technical cooperation and assistance that is provided by IAEA is not subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions that could conflict with the provisions of the IAEA Statute.

9. It should further be emphasized that an equitable balance must be achieved between the oversight activities of the Agency and those related to disseminating nuclear techniques and applications, in order to further the provisions of article III of the Treaty, which emphasizes the close relationship between matters relating to verification in accordance with comprehensive safeguard agreements with IAEA and peaceful uses. The article provides that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with IAEA. Those agreements shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of the Treaty, and avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

10. The final document of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference must establish the legitimate and firmly established rights that are accorded under the Treaty with regard to materials, equipment, and the science and technology necessary for the various peaceful applications, which include, inter alia, health, agriculture, industry and scientific research. Care must be taken to avoid any new interpretations that may conflict with the spirit of the Treaty or detract from its credibility.

11. It is also important that the final document of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference should underline the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to honour their international commitments under the Treaty by, in particular, ceasing to place technical and trade obstacles in the path of non-nuclear-weapon States, and allowing them the opportunity to benefit fully from the various peaceful applications of nuclear power.

IV. The International Atomic Energy Agency

12. It must be emphasized that IAEA has a mandate to deal with issues relating to nuclear proliferation and to establish the principle of transparency in State activities and its cooperation with them, and must be enabled to fulfil its obligations impartially and precisely and carry out the duties which were assigned to it, within the three main areas of concern of the Treaty, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear power, in accordance with the provisions of the IAEA Statute.

13. The Agency should be requested to halt the technical programme that it provides to Israel, unless that State accedes unconditionally to the Treaty without delay, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, and places all its nuclear installations under the IAEA comprehensive system of safeguards. That must be an essential precondition, if the universality, credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty is to be upheld.

14. Given that IAEA is the international organization that is responsible for security, safety and safeguards, the issues of nuclear security and safety fall within its remit.

V. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards system

15. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms its complete commitment to the provisions of the comprehensive safeguards agreement that it concluded with IAEA in 1992,

which was ratified by Law No. 5 of 1992. Pursuant to the requirements of that agreement, Syria put in place a national system for accounting for and monitoring nuclear materials. It has also put in place all the necessary facilities to promote the work of IAEA international inspectors and permit them to undertake their duties in an effective manner, in accordance with the agreement, and those facilities continue to obtain.

16. The Conference should affirm that IAEA has sole authority for verifying and ensuring that States Parties honour their safeguards agreements and fulfil their international obligations. The Agency must be requested to apply its systems to all States members, without exception or discrimination. When conducting an evaluation, it should rely on documented and verified information that does not come from open sources, or undocumented assumptions or intelligence, in order to maintain the credibility of the Agency and the goals that are set forth in its Statute.

17. All States Parties and, in particular, nuclear-weapon States, should be urged to exert greater efforts to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards, and not to place additional burdens and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States that have made a commitment to non-proliferation standards and rejected the choice of nuclear weapons.

18. It is important to maintain the distinction between the legal obligations of States Parties and voluntary confidence-building measures, the aim of which is to show the extent to which cooperation with the Agency is transparent. This was emphasized in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference that was held in New York in May 2010, as was the voluntary nature of accession to the Additional Protocol. It therefore behoves all States to maintain that distinction and ensure that voluntary measures do not become legal obligations.

VI. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East

19. It must be stressed that the establishment throughout the world of nuclear-weapon-free zones must be considered an important component of disarmament and non-nuclear proliferation, which contributes to peace and security at the regional and international levels and maintains the credibility of the Treaty.

20. It is a fact that must be underlined that the only reason the Middle East has not become a nuclear-weapon-free zone is Israel's intransigence and disregard for all the relevant resolutions of international legitimacy, which clearly request it to accede to the Treaty, and its refusal to place all its nuclear installations under the IAEA inspections regime.

21. It must yet again be stressed that no link of any kind should be made between the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the peace process in that region. No references to the States of the Middle East constitute a definition of the region, but are only for the purposes of the Conference and its Preparatory Committees.

22. If the credibility of the Treaty is not to be eroded and the whole international non-proliferation system collapse, the legitimization of the nuclear capacities of non-States Parties to the Treaty must be rejected, together with any attempt by them to join the non-proliferation regime as nuclear-weapon States. No precedent for nuclear armament must be set in the region or the world.

23. The Syrian Arab Republic has long endeavoured to make the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons. In April 2003 it presented to the Security Council in New York, on behalf of the Arab Group, an initiative to make the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, nuclear weapons. That initiative declared to the international community that Syria and its fellow Arab States would work effectively with all peace-loving States in the world towards transforming the Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. However, the positions of some of the powerful Security Council States obstructed that initiative, which the Syrian Arab Republic placed before the Council again in December 2003. Syria continues to attempt to revitalize and implement that initiative.

VII. The 2012 Conference on implementation of the resolution on the Middle East that was adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

24. It is stressed that the Security Council and, in particular, those members of it that have ratified the Treaty and which adopted the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, should fulfil its responsibility to bring pressure to bear on Israel in order to bring into being in the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

25. All States Parties must comply with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an intrinsic part of the indefinite extension package. That package included the decisions entitled: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty; Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and the resolution on the Middle East, which played an important role in inducing all the Arab States to accede to the Treaty.

26. The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference must be upheld: it determined that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved and that it constituted one of the essential components of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

27. Israel's indifference and clear and unequivocal intransigence in rejecting the relevant resolutions of international legitimacy are matters of the greatest concern. It behoves all the States involved and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States Parties, to ensure implementation of all the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the most recent of which was 66/25 of 2011, concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. That resolution urges all parties directly concerned seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

28. Action must be taken to oblige the international community and, in particular, the powerful Security Council States, to shoulder their responsibility to prevent

Israel from thwarting the international conference concerning implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East that is planned for 2012.

VIII. Negative security assurances

29. The sole absolute guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used, or their use be threatened, is the complete elimination of such weapons. The importance can therefore only be emphasized of the implementation of the decision on principles and objectives that was taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Priority must be given to the opening of genuine negotiations that are aimed towards the conclusion of an unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding international instrument that deals with security guarantee issues.

30. The nuclear-weapon States must provide non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty with comprehensive security guarantees that may be negotiated in accordance with specific grounds as part of the proposed international instrument. Nuclear weapon States must undertake, pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat to use those weapons against non-nuclear States, and make a commitment to the implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

31. One of the priorities of the final document of the 2015 Review Conference should be effective international arrangements for the conclusion of a legally binding international instrument, pursuant to which nuclear States will undertake to provide non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty with unconditional security assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. The Conference should adopt a decision in that regard that will provide those security assurances until such time as the legal instrument is concluded. Until such a legally binding instrument is concluded, all nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty must comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) that was unanimously adopted on 11 April 1995.

IX. Nuclear disarmament

32. The 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees must give consideration to the concerns of States Parties that have been set forth in their national reports and look into the extent to which nuclear-weapon States comply with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and the 13 points that were set forth in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference. They must also learn how the nuclear weapon States can justify their continuing development and production of thousands of nuclear warheads, in contravention of their undertakings under the Treaty, thereby undermining the spirit and credibility of the Treaty.

33. The vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons must be halted forthwith: genuine political will must be demonstrated by the nuclear weapon States and effective practical steps must be devised for nuclear disarmament and for the elimination of all nuclear explosive devices, with strict international oversight. It is a matter of the greatest concern that such weapons should continue to exist and threaten international peace and security.

34. Serious consideration must be given to the serious and effective implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

35. Genuine action must be taken to conduct negotiations on the formulation of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable multi-lateral treaty that will cover stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials and outlaw the production of any fissile materials for use in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a treaty would be a major step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Until such time as that treaty is concluded, all States must declare and make a commitment to a voluntary halt to the production of fissile materials for the purposes of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

X. Withdrawal from the Treaty

36. It must be reasserted that each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. When article X is being interpreted, no recourse should be had to injury of any of the rights of the State that is withdrawing, because the legal provision of that article is clear and straightforward and gives no grounds for reinterpretation.
