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STATEMENT

**by H.E. Ambassador Anatoly ANTONOV,
Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation
at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

New York, 4 May 2009

Mr. Chairman,

This session of the Preparatory Committee marks a critical stage in the preparation to the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The attention of the international community to the forthcoming Conference is obviously growing, as well as their legitimate expectations of its practical output to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

Being fully aware of the immensity and responsibility of this task, the Russian delegation looks forward to active and substantive work so that this session could prepare recommendations to be adopted by the 2010 Review Conference. We commend a "package" of specific measures to strengthen the NPT and render it more efficient based on a carefully achieved balance of its three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. Chairman,

After the end of the cold war, the world has not become a safer place. International relations are still characterized by high degree of mistrust, and some countries still regard nuclear option as an efficient means of strengthening national security and an instrument of enhancing their political authority. As a result, the noble intentions to free the world from nuclear weapons fail to be carried out, and the heavy burden of the past together with new threats pull us back and prevents us from achieving tangible results in building a safer and more predictable world order.

In this context the NPT remains of enduring significance. During almost 40 years since its entry into force, the Treaty has proved its viability and has withstood many difficult tests. It continues to serve as a foundation for progress towards irreversible nuclear disarmament. To develop international legal framework for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation the NPT needs to be further strengthened and universalized.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament is one of the pillars of the NPT. Certainly, some real progress has been made in this sphere and it would be unfair to deny this. As for Russia, we fully comply with our international obligations, which we are going to discuss in greater detail in our statement on cluster I issues.

At the same time, one can hardly characterize overall nuclear disarmament situation as satisfactory. Many plans approved at the 2000 NPT Review Conference have never been implemented. The ABM Treaty, which ensured the maintenance of strategic stability as regards strategic offensive arms reductions and limitation, is no longer effective. The START-II has never entered into force. We are also a long way to go to bring the CTBT into force. Far from completed — as the participants in the 2000 NPT Review Conference planned — the negotiations on the prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons have not even started.

Everyone in the world is aware how complex the situation is. It is not a coincidence that recent years have seen more and more new initiatives aimed at complete nuclear disarmament, such as the Hoover Initiative, the Global Zero initiative, Evans-Kawaguchi Commission, and Luxemburg Forum.

We welcome constructive steps which would help the disarmament process move out of the protracted crisis. To our mind, the main thing in this respect is to create an international environment conducive to full renunciation of nuclear weapons in the context of strengthening strategic stability and security for all.

The statement of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry A. Medvedev to the Conference on Disarmament voiced on 7 March 2009 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov and expressing support of the noble idea of freeing the world from nuclear threat is to give substantial momentum to nuclear disarmament processes. This statement has another central element, which is the call to the United States to conclude a new legally-binding agreement on further strategic arms reductions and limitation to replace the START Treaty expiring on 5 December 2009. The objectives set forth in the START Treaty have been fully achieved: both Russia and the US fulfilled and went beyond their obligations to reduce their strategic offensive arms to the limit of 1600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6000 nuclear warheads attributed to them, long ago.

On 1 April 2009, the Presidents of Russia and the US agreed to begin negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms. They reached an understanding that the Parties will seek to record levels of reductions in strategic offensive arms that will be lower than those in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (1700-2200 operationally deployed nuclear warheads).

The two parties' experts have already started the work. The first preparatory meeting took place in Rome. This week, further meetings will be held. On 7 May, the heads of foreign ministries will discuss this issue in Washington. The first full-scale round of negotiations, as we hope, will take place in Moscow between 18 and 20 May 2009.

We expect to elaborate, together with our American colleagues an arrangement envisaging lower thresholds of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles as compared to the START Treaty. It is important to reiterate the START Treaty provision which says that the Parties' respective arms shall not be deployed outside their national territories. We attach great importance to this provision with regard to both offensive and defensive systems. The inclusion of this provision in the new treaty should significantly enhance international security.

No doubt, in further negotiations, it will be crucial to take in consideration the linkage between strategic offensive and defensive arms. No real progress can be

achieved in nuclear disarmament while global missile defense is deployed unilaterally. Such developments are fraught with erosion of political stability and disequilibrium in the system of checks and balances existing in international security.

In his statement in the Helsinki University, President Dmitry A. Medvedev of the Russian Federation clearly defined the conditions enabling nuclear disarmament.

First. We must prevent the militarization of outer space. Despite all the references made to this topic, it remains a very important and complicated one.

Second. It is unacceptable to compensate nuclear reductions by developing strategic systems which are equipped with conventional weapons. This would be an unequal exchange.

And third. We must ensure the impossibility of creating so-called recoverable nuclear capabilities.

It would be underestimation to confine nuclear disarmament issues to US-Russian relations. We are convinced that the task of nuclear disarmament concerns not only nuclear-weapon states, but every Party to the NPT without exception. The ambitious goal of reaching “nuclear zero” can only be addressed together with other international issues, such as settling regional conflicts and ensuring steady viability of the key disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. We invite all delegations to engage in a sincere discussion on all these issues at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We expect that other nuclear-weapon states continue their nuclear disarmament efforts, which will further expand the US-Russian dialogue to five-party talks. Besides, one can hardly imagine a situation when the Parties to the NPT possessing nuclear weapons disarm while others who are not bound by the Treaty retain and build-up their nuclear weapons capabilities.

We believe that practical implementation of Russian-American initiative to render the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles global could make a significant contribution to this end. We also believe that any attempts to use one’s participation in the NPT as a disguise to develop military nuclear programmes are inadmissible. We support developing a systemic dialogue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines of both nuclear-weapon states and the states possessing nuclear-weapons capabilities — India, Pakistan and Israel.

Certainly, the Conference on Disarmament has things to do; we could continue collective discussion of nuclear disarmament prospects there. Russia supports establishing subsidiary bodies to the Conference to deal with these issues, as well as security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states.

We support the early launch of negotiation on the fissile material cut-off at the Disarmament Conference. We contend that all the necessary conditions for this have been created. The 2010 NPT Review Conference should reiterate the importance of this

work in Geneva as another step towards nuclear disarmament and strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime.

There is another crucial factor contributing to progressive advance towards “global zero”, which is the early entry into force of the CTBT. Russia ratified this Treaty as far back as in 2000 and has consistently made efforts to ensure its earliest possible entry into force. Observing the moratorium on nuclear testing is a significant measure but it cannot substitute for legal obligations arising from the CTBT. We expect that all countries whose accession to the CTBT will bring it into force sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. Certainly, many things here will depend on the US position. The Joint Statement on the outcome of the London meeting of President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia and President Barack Obama of the United States of America underscored the importance of entering into force the CTBT as a key measure of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In this respect we welcome the Prague Statement of 5 April 2009 by President Obama that his Administration would immediately and actively pursue the ratification by the US of this Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are indivisible, therefore, further efforts are required to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation regime. The tasks in this field are truly immense. Those include resolving regional non-proliferation issues, enhancing IAEA verification capability, and preventing nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.

We have gone a long way towards establishing an efficient international “safety net” to prevent non-state actors, primarily terrorists, from getting access to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. To this end, the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted, Russian-American Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was launched, joint actions are taken in the framework of multilateral export control regimes, and the IAEA verification activities are strengthened.

Yet, even more remains to be done. The results of the work of the 1540 Committee of the UN Security Council are another proof of that, as far from all the countries fail to actively cooperate with it and provide the necessary information on national nuclear materials monitoring systems. Besides, only 75 countries participate in the Global Initiative to Combat Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and what about the rest?

We are seriously concerned over outstanding issues around Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes. Russia has consistently supported political and diplomatic settlement of these issues.

We believe that today we have a unique window of opportunity to launch negotiations with Iran in the spirit of mutual respect and equality based on the existing proposals of the six countries in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement and to

restore confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear programme.

We consider the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the six-party talks and renew its nuclear programme to be a mistake. We call upon North Korea to renew negotiations in order to search for mutually acceptable solutions and advance towards a comprehensive resolution of the issue and ensuring a nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsula and the eventual DPRK's return to the NPT.

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is to contribute greatly to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. In this context, we welcome the entry into force on 21 March 2009 of the Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. At the same time, the existing NWFZs (there are five of them, comprising more than 110 states) have not yet become fully operational.

In the Middle East, the decision of the 1995 NPT Review Conference to establish a zone free from nuclear weapons, as well as from all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, has never been implemented. We are prepared to engage in a substantive dialogue with all the interested countries and discuss constructive proposals aimed at implementing this Resolution and developing specific recommendations on the matter by the forthcoming 2010 Review Conference. Russian delegation will present its proposals during this session of the Preparatory Committee.

Mr. Chairman,

Improving the efficiency of the IAEA verification activities is an important aspect of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe that the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement is an efficient instrument to provide more opportunities for the Agency in this area. In the future, the Additional Protocol, together with the Safeguards Agreement, should become a universally accepted standard to verify the compliance of states with their NPT non-proliferation obligations and an essential new standard in the field of nuclear exports. In the recommendations to the 2010 NPT Review Conference we should send a message to the countries that have yet to bring the Additional Protocols into force, primarily those who carry out significant nuclear activities or possess significant amounts of nuclear material, calling them to do this as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

In today's world it is evident that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are intertwined. Nuclear energy becomes a resource ensuring national energy security. At the same time, in pursuit of greater benefits from peaceful uses of nuclear energy one cannot ignore the risks related to possible proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies.

Each Party to the Treaty has the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This opens new opportunities for international cooperation, primarily with the view to ensuring reliable and guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies to the countries developing peaceful nuclear energy programmes and fully complying with the requirements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Multilateral approaches offering economically and practically feasible alternative to developing national sensitive elements of a nuclear fuel cycle, become of increasing importance. The implementation of these multilateral approaches will benefit all the Parties to the NPT (win-win game), on the one hand, preventing sensitive technologies replication around the world, and, on the other hand, giving many countries opportunity to realize their legitimate interest in developing nuclear energy while reducing to the minimum both time and financial resources required (the latter is especially important in the context of continuing global financial and economic crisis).

It is in the vein of multilateral approaches that Russian President proposed the initiative on developing global nuclear energy infrastructure, including the establishment of international centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services. Russia and Kazakhstan have already established International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk. Ukraine and Armenia are finalizing their accession procedures. There are some other states which express interest in the Center.

At this Angarsk Center, a low-enriched uranium reserve managed by the IAEA is to be set-up in order to ensure guaranteed supplies in case market mechanisms fail. This is a response to concerns of those who do not want to be fully dependent on the situation in the market or on political will of certain states.

Mr. Chairman,

Russian delegation sincerely hopes that this session of the Preparatory Committee will be constructive without falling into "wars" of ideologies and positions. Certainly, differences are inevitable, taking into consideration the scale of the discussions, yet let us argue in such a way that the truth prevailed in our arguments and the outcome benefited the NPT. We are prepared to cooperate with you and with other delegations in order to create favourable conditions for the success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Thank you.